International co-authorship is generally thought and often found to have positive effects on the citation rate of scientific publications. We study the effect quantitatively in the example of four major and four medium Hungarian universities. The conclusions may be generalized to other countries of similar international status.

International co-authorship is generally thought and often found to have positive effects on the citation rate of scientific publications. We study the effect quantitatively in the example of four major and two medium Hungarian universities. It was found that the positive effect of international cooperation on citation impact was not limited either to a small set of highly cited papers or a narrow range of highly influential countries, although both the highest cited papers and the "scientific superpowers" had emphatic significance in determining the incremental citation impact values. Although Hungarian institutions are recently mainly encouraged to cooperate with EU partners, the USA and even countries from the Far-East and the Pacific region proved to be successful cooperating partners, as well. The conclusions may be generalized to other countries of similar international status.

Gabor Fodor and the Free Democrats rejected the Gyurcsany package. They were right in grasping that only one sentence of this programme needed to be taken seriously: "If Parliament does not accept this programme, I will resign." The Socialist Party's leaders have now either to support Gyurcsany and his package, or they have to persuade Gyurcsany to resign from the prime minister ship, remaining party leader until the next congress. The second course of events is in the country's interest: a convincing government with a convincing prime minister.

HVG-Online, 2008. szeptember 1.

English version: HVG-Online, 2008.szeptember 11.

Regardless of attempts by protestant German and Catholic Polish bishops to reconcile, regardless of Brandt's kneeling in Warsaw, of Germany's support for Poland's membership of NATO and the EU, there is still no reconciliation, and no Europeanisation. Today, we are further from reconciliation than 20 years ago. And there is no Polish-Russian, German-Czech, Romanian-Hungarian or Slovak-Hungarian reconciliation either, let alone Serb-Croat or Serb-Albanian reconciliation. Endless rounds of new wounds.

One basic decision to be made for the distribution of welfare assistance is how to assign the entitlement criteria. This also determines the number of those concerned and thus the extent of community expenditures. These principles are not only manifold in theory; but Hungarian practice also applies various methods in parallel. This study reviews the most important theoretically possible types of approach applied today, primarily on the basis of data supplied by the Hungarian Statistical Office and Tárki. The main task for the analysis is to determine the benefit requirements of how many people (households) should be taken into account when applying certain criteria, i.e. what multiplication factors can be assigned to the various political decisions regulating the macro-economic expenditures, also taking into consideration the advantages and drawbacks of the different approaches.

Esély (Chance) year 17, volume 4, July 2006 pp. 3-20

The most frequently mentioned element of Union accession, considered by many to be the most important, is the acquisition and distribution of community subsidies. The question is whether the subsidy Hungary receives from the European Union is essentially different from what until now we have called state aid. Will the subsidy received from the Union become a component of domestic redistribution? Initial and as yet incomplete experience suggests that it is a matter of a shift in proportions rather than a sharp turn. Although additional funds flowing into the economy are still slight, the Union subsidy and the co-financing commitment have not replaced the earlier redistribution, but have come along side it to some extent. Redistribution within the economy has therefore probably grown slightly following accession, despite the fact that enterprises only received one third of the structural funds directly, the rest being granted to non-profit organisations and to the state administration in control of distribution. The weight of decisions made by the single state apparatus has not changed, and may even have grown. The system of tenders has not become exclusive at all.

2006. (Éva Voszka)

Mainstream approach in 1990s considered the extension of private ownership, including transfer of state assets into private hands as a cornerstone of transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, economists and politicians in these years were concerned mainly to justify privatization. Now the endgame, sales of remaining assets and in some cases revision of unsuccessful transactions is bringing back into the crossfire of political contention some basic theoretical issues debated at the beginning of privatization. Does it matter at all who the owner is? What can justify maintaining and extending state ownership? Can the state operate as a better owner in a market economy than in a planned economy? With almost 15 years experience of economic transformation, it becomes possible to examine the validity of theories in the light of practice.

Közgazdasági Szemle – Economic Review LII. évf., 2005. January pp. 1 - 23.

The Economic Competition Office’s role in shaping market structure

According to economic arguments, the monopolized enterprise structure inherited from the planned economy acts as an obstacle of market competition, so many of the big, artificially created state-owned firms have to be broken up. The state, through the Economic Competition Office as ‘guardian’ of competition, has to play an active role in this process. The logic is clear, but it was a matter of dispute both theoretically and in practice. The article presents the theoretical dilemmas of demonopolization that appeared during transformation. It shows the attempts to resolve them through competition regulation and the decisions of the Competition Office. The author concludes that the main role in building up competitive market structure was not played by the Competition Office, which declined the task to revise the inherited structure and to oppose several privatization decisions, considering these issues economically and politically sensitive. On the other hand, most mergers and takeovers connected with privatization were simply permitted not in contradiction with the law but sometimes by inconsistent reasoning.

Közgazdasági Szemle – Economic Review, LI. évf., 2004. January pp.1 - 23.

Várhegyi, É.: Bank Competition in Hungary. Acta Oeconomica, Vol 54(3) 2004.